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I. INTRODUCTION
The long, drawn-out battle over the adoption of the new antiboy-
cott law is over. The legislation, which was three years in the mak-
ing, was signed into law on June 22, 1977.' Its implementing regula-
tions were promulgated in accordance with the statutory mandate
on January 18, 1978 after an extraordinary and exhaustive public
comment period.'
Both the statute and the regulations are the product of intense
and often bitter debate. That debate is likely to continue as the law
is applied and enforced. But for the moment at least, the contending
interests have expressed general satisfaction with the new regula-
tions,' although not surprisingly, differences on details persist.
* The author is indebted to Vincent J. Rocque for the citations in the footnotes, and to
Zula Dietrich for her patient typing. The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Department of Commerce or the United States Government
generally.
** Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Industry and Trade, Department of Commerce.
I Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as EAAI amending the Export Administration Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app.
§ 2401, et seq. (1970) (amended 1974).
2 On September 20, 1977, the Department of Commerce invited interested persons to
submit comments on its proposed regulations to implement Title II of the Export Administra-
tion Amendments of 1977. Comments were to be delivered by November 21, 1977. In response,
the Department received 178 submissions containing comments and suggestions totalling
over 1,000 pages. Earlier, in response to its July 13, 1977, advance notice of proposed rulemak-
ing in this matter, the Department received 152 submissions containing comments totalling
over 1,750 pages. Included in these totals are written summaries of meetings between officials
of the Department and numerous persons who requested such meetings in order to make
comments and suggestions on the regulations to implement the Act. All these comments are
on the public record. (These submissions are on file in the Freedom of Information Record
Inspection Facility of the Industry and Trade Administration, Room 3012, United States
Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230).
In a January 31, 1978 letter to the Secretary of Commerce, Irving Shapiro, the Chairman
of the Business Roundtable, which actively participated in the development of the legislation,
said that despite disagreement on some of the issues, "we believe that the Commerce Depart-
ment's representatives charged with the responsibility of formulating these Regulations have
performed their difficult assignment in a diligent, conscientious and professional manner."
Letter from Irving Shapiro to Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce (January 31, 1978). And
in a joint press release issued shortly after the final regulations were promulgated, the Ameri-
can Jewish Committee, the American Jewish Congress, and the Anti-Defamation League of
B'nai Brith, all of which actively participated in the development of the legislation, declared
their "satisfaction with the thrust" of the regulations despite some residual concerns. Joint
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Whether that satisfaction continues depends on how the law is ap-
plied and enforced, the ability and willingness of American busi-
nessmen and their foreign customers to accommodate to conflicts in
their respective laws, and the willingness of boycotting states to
accommodate their own boycott enforcement objectives to United
States legal requirements.
This Article describes the philosophy of the new law, outlines its
structure and principal elements, and examines a number of the
more important practical and jurisprudential issues which it raises.
II. PHILOSOPHY OF THE NEW LAW
The new antiboycott law is the product of growing public and
congressional concern over the intrusion of the Arab boycott against
Israel into internal American affairs through its impact on private
economic decisions. While the boycott has been in effect since 1946,
it was only with the vast accumulation of wealth in many parts of
the Arab world, following the dramatic increase in OPEC oil prices
in 1973 and thereafter, that its significance for American interests
began to be realized. Burgeoning business opportunities in the Arab
world provided the boycotting states with the muscle to enforce
their long-standing boycott and businessmen, seeking a share of
that lucrative market, with a strong incentive to comply. Reports
filed with the Department of Commerce under an earlier law re-
vealed that in well over 90% of American business transactions in-
volving boycott requirements of one kind or another, American com-
panies complied with the boycott requirement.' During the year
ending March 31, 1977, American exporters reported their compli-
ance or intent to comply with boycott requirements in transactions
involving more than $4.4 billion in American trade.
Contemplated legislative remedies ranged from mild admonish-
ments along the lines of existing law to absolute prohibitions against
compliance with foreign boycotts in any and all aspects. An infor-
mal Senate-House conference committee convened in the fall of
1976 to resolve the differences between significantly different Senate
and House versions of antiboycott legislation passed earlier that
year and produced agreement on the approach which was eventually
Statement of American Jewish Committee, American Jewish Congress and Anti-Defamation
League of B'nai Brith (January 26, 1978).
BUREAU OF EAST-WEST TRADE, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REP. No.
114, at 11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REP.].
Id. at 14; EXPORT ADMINISTRATION REP. No. 115, supra note 4 at 15.
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to emerge as law.' While modified in detail before enactment the
following year, the agreed-upon approach was to prohibit, generally,
compliance with most of the secondary and so-called tertiary di-
mensions of foreign boycotts while generally leaving untouched
compliance with their primary dimensions. It was this basic philo-
sophical approach which was eventually embodied in the law and
is reflected in its implementing regulations.
As such, the law is not an attempt to interfere with the right of a
foreign country to conduct a boycott directly against another. It
recognizes that such primary boycotts are an inherent prerogative
of sovereignty and that legislated non-compliance would be tanta-
mount to a counter boycott.
What the law seeks to do instead is prohibit United States citi-
zens from assuming the responsibility for enforcing foreign boycotts
against others and to give all United States citizens an equal oppor-
tunity to participate in boycotting country markets. In that vein it
reflects deeply held American principles opposing discrimination
and anti-competitive behavior. At the same time, the law is in-
tended to preserve United States sovereignty itself by preventing
the enlistment of its own citizens in economic warfare against a
friendly country.
Thus, the new foreign boycott law is both the product of laudable
objectives and a reflection of basic American precepts. Few would
support the proposition that American business should be permit-
ted to discriminate against United States citizens on the basis of
race, religion, sex, or national origin under any circumstances, let
alone in order to comply with the foreign policy or other objectives
of a foreign government. Few would support the proposition that
American businessmen should be permitted to engage in systematic
exclusion of other American businessmen from economic opportuni-
ties in order to advance the foreign policy or other objectives of
another country. And many thoughtful Americans recognize the
threat to United States interest which occurs when American citi-
zens cooperate in advancing a foreign power's political objectives.
These are issues which transcend the immediate Arab-Israeli con-
' A formal Senate-House conference could not be convened because of opposing parliamen-
tary tactics. Nonetheless, conferees met informally and agreed on compromise legislation (S.
69) which was introduced in the Senate by Senator Stevenson during the 95th Congress. See
generally REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS ON S. 69,
S. REP. No. 104, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS. (1977) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
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flict in the Middle East.
But laudable objectives and the attainment of those objectives
are two different things. Conflicts, dilemmas, inconsistencies, and
misperceptions are inevitable. This is especially true in a highly
charged political setting.
One of the ironies of the new antiboycott law is that a statute
which attempts to prevent infringements of United States sover-
eignty inevitably infringes on the sovereign rights of other countries
when it attempts to regulate the activities of United States citizens
abroad and foreign subsidiaries of United States corporations. The
conflict is most acute where United States law attempts to govern
the activities of persons physically present in a country with directly
contrary laws or policies. There United States law and policy and
the law and policy of the host country are in direct confrontation.
It was in part the recognition of this conflict that gave rise to the
exception in the new law to permit United States persons resident
in a foreign country, including a boycotting country, to comply with
the boycott laws of that country with respect to activities exclu-
sively within the country and with respect to certain importing ac-
tivities.7 Still the exception is far from absolute since it does not
permit compliance with boycott laws requiring information pertain-
ing to or discrimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national
origin,8 and it places significant qualifications on the ability to com-
ply with host country laws pertaining to import activities.'
The conflict between United States law and policy and that of a
foreign country is less acute where the host country is not a boycot-
ting country. It is nonetheless potentially significant. Where the
non-boycotting host country has no policy one way or the other with
respect to the boycott which is the target of United States law, the
conflict may be more theoretical than real but nonetheless could
give rise to general concern about the extraterritorial application of
United States law as a matter of general principle.10
7 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F).
Id. § 4A(a)(3).
An exception is provided for compliance by a United States person in a foreign country
or agreement by such a person to comply with the laws or regulations of that country govern-
ing imports into the country of trademarked, trade-named, or similarly specifically identifia-
ble products or components of products for his own use, including the performance of contrac-
tual services within that country. Id. § 4A(a)(2)(F).
10 Such concerns have been expressed, for example, by the Government of Canada and
other countries with respect to the application of the United States' embargo of Cuba to the
foreign subsidiaries of United States companies. For a discussion of this concern, see Note,
[Vol. 8:559
ANTIBOYCOTT REGULATION
The conflict may be more than theoretical in such a country,
however, where adverse economic consequences might result from
contraints imposed by United States law on the ability of the foreign
country's resident companies to do business with boycotting coun-
tries. A foreign country heavily dependent on trade with a boycot-
ting country where a significant proportion of that trade is ac-
counted for by United States subsidiaries subject to United States
antiboycott law would understandably have a substantial economic
interest in the extraterritorial reach of that law. The economic inter-
est may be buttressed by the foreign country's political interests
where its own foreign policy posture toward the boycotting country
is supportive rather than neutral or where it fears retaliation by a
boycotting country for other than a neutral stance.
While a law which seeks to protect United States sovereignty
itself intrudes upon the sovereignty of others, the failure to reach the
activities of either United States citizens abroad or foreign subsidi-
aries of United States companies where they are in fact controlled
by their United States parent would seriously undermine the effi-
cacy of the law in a world of multinational enterprises. It would also
provide substantial incentives to shift United States operations
abroad to escape the law altogether with attendant adverse conse-
quences for United States economic activity. This is a recurring
issue in modern attempts to regulate the activities of the multina-
tional enterprise. The new antiboycott law is but one example of the
difficult issues presented by modern economic regulation.
As the new antiboycott law is analyzed, it is apparent that it
presents a number of these issues in acute form. While its philosoph-
ical contours are relatively clear, its practical implementation re-
quires numerous steps across otherwise rigid boundaries in order to
accomplish the statute's fundamental objectives.
III. STRUCTURE OF THE LAW
The statute is structured with a series of prohibitions and a series
of exceptions. Together they generally permit compliance with pri-
mary boycott requirements with certain notable exceptions while
generally prohibiting compliance with secondary boycott require-
ments, again with certain notable exceptions. In addition, there is
a separate statutory provision which makes the law applicable to
The Extraterritorial Application of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977, 8 GA.
J. INT'L & COMP. L. 741 (1978).
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any transaction or activity undertaken with intent to evade the law.
The three key common elements of the law are as follows: First,
it applies to "United States persons," a term defined to include the
controlled foreign subsidiaries of United States companies." Sec-
ond, it applies only to actions in United States commerce,' 2 a term
amplified at length in the regulations.' 3 Third, the Act applies only
to actions taken with intent to comply with, further, or support a
foreign boycott against a friendly country where the United States
does not itself boycott that country.' 4 Contrary to some impressions,
this requirement does not mean that one has to agree with or sup-
port the objectives of a foreign boycott before a violation may occur.
In fact one may disagree with its goals entirely and do so explicitly.
Nonetheless, if a prohibited boycott condition is complied with, a
violation may occur.
The first two of these three common elements of the statute pres-
ent threshold jurisdictional questions. The last, "intent," is an ulti-
mate question pertaining to the legal character of a particular act.
IV. PROHIBITIONS
The basic prohibitions of the statute are as follows:
First, there is a broad based general prohibition against refusing
to do business with anyone, including the boycotted country, pur-
suant to an agreement with, requirement of, or request from or on
behalf of a boycotting country.'5 This prohibition encompasses such
things as excluding certain firms or persons from participating in a
business transaction because they are blacklisted or selecting as
participants in a business transaction only those who are not black-
listed. This is the first and perhaps most fundamental provision of
the new law.
The second is a corollary of the first. It is a general prohibition
against discrimination against United States persons on the basis
of race, religion, sex, or national origin.'" This includes discrimina-
tion in employment. Like the prohibition on refusals to do busi-
1, EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1) and EAA sec. 204 amending § 11(2) of the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1969, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410 (1970).
2 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1).
13 Export Administration Regulations on Restrictive Trade Practices or Boycotts
[hereinafter cited as EAR] § 369.1(d), 43 Fed. Reg. 3508, 3514-16 (1978) (to be codified in
15 C.F.R. pt. 369).
1 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(1).
" Id. § 4A(a)(1)(A).
I d. § 4A(a)(1)(B).
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ness, as well as all other prohibitions, this applies only to actions
taken with intent to comply with, further, or support an unsanc-
tioned foreign boycott.
The third prohibition is a general prohibition against furnishing
information with respect to the race, religion, sex, or national origin
of any United States person where that information is furnished
with intent to comply with, further, or support a foreign boycott."
This is an adjunct of the prohibition against discrimination and is
intended to terminate the supply of information thought necessary
for boycott enforcement purposes where the boycott involved dis-
crimination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.
The fourth prohibition is a general prohibition against furnishing
information about business relationships with a boycotted country,
with business concerns organized under the laws of a boycotted
country, with nationals or residents of a boycotted country, or with
any person known or believed to be restricted from doing business
with or in a boycotted country." The statute admonishes that noth-
ing in this prohibition shall prohibit the furnishing of normal busi-
ness information in a commercial context. 9 The target is informa-
tion about business relations sought for boycott enforcement pur-
poses, such as, "Do you do business with blacklisted firms; Do you
do business with Israel?"
This prohibition, like the prohibition against supplying informa-
tion about race, religion, sex, or national origin, is an adjunct of
another prohibition, namely, the prohibition against refusing to do
business. It is intended to terminate the flow of information com-
monly sought for boycott enforcement purposes. If firms were per-
mitted to respond to boycott questions by indicating the absence of
an offending business relationship with a boycotted country, they
would most likely find themselves at an advantage over those who
could not so respond. However, because of its categorical nature,
this prohibition does raise the possibility that firms which do have
business relationships with boycotted countries and intend to con-
tinue such relationships may find themselves blacklisted because of
their inability to respond to boycott questions rather than because
of the offending business relationship itself.
A fifth major prohibition reflects the application of the basic pro-
7 !d. § 4A(a)(1)(C).
Id. § 4A(a)(1)(D).
g Id.
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hibitions of the statute to the special case of letters of credit. That
prohibition makes it illegal to implement a letter of credit which
contains conditions or requirements which may not legally be com-
plied with under the antiboycott law. 0 Therefore, the central issue
for an implementing bank is whether the beneficiary may comply
with the boycott requirements which appear in a letter of credit.
Special jurisdictional rules apply to the letter of credit prohibition
in order to minimize the uncertainty which could exist due to the
difficulty of determining whether the statutory jurisdictional tests
had been met.
Basically, those special rules provide that the letter of credit pro-
hibition applies only when the beneficiary is a United States person
and the transaction to which the letter of credit relates is in United
States commerce.2 For United States banks implementing letters
of credit in the United States, the regulations establish a presump-
tion that the beneficiary is a United States person and that the
transaction is in United States commerce where the letter of credit
specifies a United States address for the beneficiary.22 For United
States banks implementing letters of credit abroad, there is a pre-
sumption that both conditions are met; namely, the beneficiary is
a United States person and the transaction is in United States com-
merce, where the letter of credit specifies a United States address
for the beneficiary and the documents indicate that the goods are
to be shipped from the United States.23 In both cases these presump-
tions are rebuttable by a showing that either the beneficiary is not
a United States person or that the goods are to be shipped from
other than the United States.24
V. EXCEPTIONS
The exceptions, which apply to all the prohibitions, are intended
to permit compliance with essentially primary boycott require-
ments. They do, however, permit significant levels of compliance
with secondary boycott requirements but only under circumstances
of duress, such as where the United States person is subject to
conflicting foreign laws, or in circumstances where the responsibility
10 Id. § 4A(a)(1)(F).
21 EAR § 369.2(f)(6), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
22 EAR § 369.2(f)(7), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
22 EAR § 369.2(f)(9), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
24 EAR § 369.2(f)(7) and (9), 43 Fed. Reg. 3523 (1978).
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for boycott based choices is assumed by a resident of a boycotting
country.
The first exception generally permits compliance with boycotting
country prohibitions on the importation into a boycotting country
of goods or services from the boycotted country or goods or services
produced by boycotted country companies, residents, or nationals.25
This exception also generally permits compliance with boycotting
country prohibitions on the shipment of goods to the boycotting
country on a carrier of the boycotted country or by a route other
than as prescribed by the boycotting country. 2
Both of these provisions directly relate to primary boycott re-
quirements. They recognize that any boycotting country has a right
to insist that goods or services which it imports not be from a boy-
cotted country and that any goods which it purchases not be
shipped on a carrier of a boycotted country. In addition, they recog-
nize that any boycotting country has a legitimate interest in seeing
to it that its goods are not shipped via the territorial waters or ports
of a boycotted country. All of these are essential protections for any
country engaged in a direct boycott against another, and to prevent
United States companies from complying with these requirements
would be tantamount to depriving them of the opportunity to do
business with a boycotting country-in short, a legislatively man-
dated counter boycott.
The second exception is a corollary of the first and deals with
boycotting country import and shipping document requirements.
Under that exception, a person subject to United States boycott law
may comply with a boycotting country's import and shipping docu-
ment requirements with respect to the country of origin, the name
of the carrier and route of shipment, the name of the supplier of the
shipment, and the name of the provider of other services.2 A major
qualification on this exception is that after June 21, 1978, no infor-
mation supplied in response to such requirements may be stated in
negative or blacklisting terms. 28 For example, while it will be per-
missible after June 21, 1978, to certify that the goods in a particular
shipment are "Made in U.S.A.," it will not be permissible to certify
that they are not made in a particular country. 9 By the same token,
25 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(A).
"Id.
Id. § 4A(a)(2)(B).
2Id.
" EAR § 369.3(b), Examples (i) and (ii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
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while it will be permissible to certify that the goods are made by a
particular company, it will not be permissible to certify that they
are not made by, say, blacklisted firms or that they are not made
by a particular company. 30
A positive statement that goods are made in a given country
necessarily conveys the information that they were not made in
another country, including, obviously, a boycotted country. Simi-
larly, a statement that goods are made by ABC company necessarily
conveys the information that they are not made by XYZ company,
and where ABC company is not blacklisted, the certification neces-
sarily conveys the information that the goods are not made by a
blacklisted firm. To that extent, a positive certification is as effec-
tive as a negative certification in primary boycott enforcement.
Nonetheless, Congress recognized that import and shipping docu-
ment requirements of the type specified are a normal requirement
of international commerce and that despite their utility for boycott
enforcement purposes, they cannot be outlawed without bringing
trade with boycotting countries to a halt. Moreover, Congress also
recognized that it would be inconsistent to permit compliance with
primary boycott requirements generally but prohibit compliance
with corresponding certification requirements. However, negative
certifications to the effect that goods are not made in a boycotted
country or that they are not made by a boycotted country company
adds nothing to the effectiveness of primary boycott enforcement,
and their general use can have the effect of discouraging the explora-
tion of business opportunities with the boycotted country. By gener-
ally prohibiting negative certifications, the Congress retained con-
sistency with the primary boycott exception while reducing the po-
tential chilling effect on trade with boycotted countries and black-
listed firms which can arise from the practice of issuing blanket
statements that a particular country or a category of persons is
excluded from a transaction.
An important qualification on the general prohibition against
negative certifications is that it does not generally apply to carriers
and their routes of shipment.3 The statute recognizes that negative
certifications in this area are a reasonable and not entirely unusual
requirement imposed by boycotting countries to protect the buyer
of goods against war risks or confiscation. Therefore, under the regu-
EAR § 369.3(b), Example (iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
31 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(B).
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lations, it is permissible for a United States exporter to certify that
the goods will not be shipped on a carrier which flies the flag of, is
owned, chartered, leased, or operated by the boycotted country or
by nationals or residents of a boycotted country.32 It is also permis-
sible under the regulations to certify that the vessel will not stop at
the port of a boycotted country en route to a boycotting country. 3
Permission to make either type of certification is consistent with
the statute's general recognition of the right of any state to conduct
a primary boycott against another and to take reasonable steps to
insure that that boycott is observed. A certification that goods will
not be shipped on a boycotted country's carrier or through a boycot-
ted country's waters or airspace is a reasonable means of protecting
a boycotting country's property against confiscation by the boycot-
ted country.34
Despite the relationship between the exception for primary boy-
cott compliance and the exception for import and shipping docu-
ment compliance, the two cannot be combined in determining the
scope of the statute's exception from the information furnishing
prohibition. For example, while it is permissible under the primary
boycott exception to agree not to import into a boycotting country
goods produced by a business concern organized under the laws of
a boycotted country, it, nonetheless, generally violates the informa-
tion furnishing prohibition for a company to certify or otherwise
supply information to the effect that the companies with which it
may be doing business are not organized under the laws of a boycot-
ted country. It also generally violates the information prohibition to
supply that same information through another formulation, for ex-
ample, by a statement that the companies with which one is doing
business are incorporated in a particular country where that infor-
mation is furnished with intent to comply with boycott require-
ments. The only exception is with respect to carriers where there is
a broad based statutory exception permitting negative certifications
to protect against war risk or confiscation.
The reason for this seeming anomaly is that the information pro-
hibition expressly prohibits furnishing information about whether
one has a business relationship with any business concern organized
under the laws of a boycotted country. To interpret the primary
3, EAR § 369.3(b), Example (vii), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
EAR § 369.3(b), Example (ix), 43 Fed. Reg. 3526 (1978).
EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(B).
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boycott exception as allowing the furnishing of that information
(except to the extent to which it is indirectly conveyed through an
agreement) would permit the exception to swallow the rule. It would
do violence not only to the delicately balanced statutory scheme but
also to the express statutory admonition to construe the exceptions
narrowly,' 5 to permit the general primary boycott exception to
overrule the information prohibition itself or modify the explicit
and deliberately narrow import and shipping document exception.
The third exception represents a significant departure from the
law's basic goal of preventing secondary boycott compliance. Under
this exception, persons subject to the law may comply with so-called
"unilateral selections" of carriers, insurers, suppliers of services to
be performed within the boycotting country, and specific goods
which in the normal course of business are identifiable by source
upon importation into the boycotting country. These so-called uni-
lateral selections must be made by a person who resides in the
boycotting country, but among those who qualify as residents are
United States persons. 31
This exception was one of the most intensely debated provisions
of the new law, with most of the debate centered on the question of
whether compliance with unilateral selections made by United
States persons should be permitted. It reflects a recognition of the
fact that the inability to comply with customer choices of specified
products or participants in a transaction would essentially termi-
nate trade with boycotting countries since such choices when made
by a boycotting country or by persons residing in a boycotting coun-
try are presumably in conformity with boycott requirements. Com-
pliance with such choices under those circumstances could be re-
garded as a refusal to do business for boycott reasons with those not
chosen. At the very least, the basis for the choice in those circum-
stances is ambiguous. When a boycotting country customer in-
structs his United States supplier to supply items made only by
company A, the choice of A would in all probability be in conformity
with boycott requirements even if non-boycott reasons for the selec-
tion are present as well. Whether or not boycott conformity is a
factor in the selection, the United States supplier would run the risk
of an alleged refusal to do business if he complied with the selection
since it would be arguable that he knew or should have known that
Id. § 4A(a)(6).
EAR § 369.3(c)(7), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
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any such choice would in all probability have excluded blacklisted
persons.
Thus, the unilateral selection exception is a mechanism for re-
moving the threat of illegality which would hang over United States
persons who carried out their boycotting country customers' choices.
The exception is also a recognition of the relative ease with which a
boycotting country can exclude carriers, individuals, goods, and, to
a degree, providers of services where physical presence within the
country may be necessary in order to supply the service effectively.
The key limitation on the use of this exception for secondary
boycott compliance arises from the terms "unilateral" and
"specific" as used in the exception. To come within the exception,
the customer's choice must be unilateral and specific. Under the
regulations, a "unilateral" selection is one in which the discretion
in making the selection is exercised by the boycotting country
buyer. 7 In other words, the United States supplier may not himself
make the decision for his customer. A "specific" selection under the
regulations is one which is stated in the affirmative and specifies a
particular supplier of goods or services for inclusion in the transac-
tion.38 The distinction is between a customer's instruction to exclude
all blacklisted subcontractors, for example, from a transaction and
an instruction to subcontract only with company A with respect to
goods whose manufacturer can be identified by an inspection of the
goods at the time of importation. The latter is an affirmative and
specific selection; the former is not.
Taken together, these two limitations are intended to place full
responsibility for boycott-based choices on the boycotting country
buyer and prevent United States persons from taking upon them-
selves the responsibility for enforcing the foreign country's boycott.
Where the boycotting country buyer is willing and able to identify
precisely the persons with whom he wishes to do business, the uni-
lateral selection exception generally permits United States persons
to fulfill his wishes. But the exception does not permit United States
persons to carry out generalized instructions to see to it that boycott
conditions are met and blacklisted persons as a class systematically
excluded from business transactions with boycotting countries, nor
does it permit United States persons to carry out discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin, even where a
7 EAR § 369.3(c)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
EAR § 369.3(c)(4), 43 Fed. Reg. 3527 (1978).
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unilateral selection is involved. Compliance with such discrimina-
tory selections is expressly prohibited. 9
Whether the relatively fine distinction between "unilateral" and
other selections can be drawn in practice presents one of the more
significant challenges to effective enforcement of the law. But the
failure to make the distinction would produce artificial bifurcation
of otherwise integrated transactions and significantly limit United
States participation in certain kinds of business functions, such as
general contracting, where the essential service peformed is the inte-
gration of widely diverse activities to produce a single result. Rather
than employing a general contractor to marshall the forces needed
to complete a project, the customer would either assume the general
contracting role himself-an unlikely possibility-or employ a non-
United States person to perform it for him. In either case, while no
antiboycott purpose would be served, there would almost certainly
be a redirection of business opportunities away from United States
firms.
The fourth exception represents the other half of the primary
boycott exception. Under this exception, a person subject to the law
may comply with a boycotting country's prohibition on exporting
goods from the boycotting country to the boycotted country, to na-
tionals or residents of the boycotted country, or to business concerns
of or organized under the laws of a boycotted country. 0 The excep-
tion recognizes the legitimate interest a country has in controlling
the destination of its exports, an interest which the United States
freely exercises through its extensive system of export controls for
national security and foreign policy reasons.
The fifth exception permits compliance with a boycotting coun-
try's immigration, visa, or employment information requirements.',
It reflects the fact that information regarding race, religion, sex, and
national origin is required in many parts of the world in order to
secure a visa or work papers. Constraints on the ability to supply
that information would impair if not terminate travel to boycotting
countries by United States citizens. However, because of the danger
that this exception could be used by United States companies for
purposes of facilitating boycotting country discrimination, the ex-
ception permits only an individual on his own behalf or on behalf
' EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(3).
Id. § 4A(a)(2)(D).
Id. § 4A(a)(2)(E).
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of his family to supply necessary visa, immigration, or employment
information pertaining to race, religion, sex, or national origin. This
is to prevent United States employers from furnishing lists of em-
ployees seeking permission to enter a boycotting country with their
race, religion, sex, or national origin identified, thereby facilitating
systematic exclusion on one of those grounds by the boycotting
country.
An important operational consequence of this exception is that it
permits employers whose employees are denied entry into a boycot-
ting country to proceed nonetheless with their business activities
within that country. This aspect of the exception is not self evident
from the statutory provision itself but is explicitly spelled out in the
Senate Report.42 Without such latitude to pursue business activities
in a boycotting country, the ability of United States companies to
do business in boycotting countries would be dependent on that
country's immigration policies.
The last exception recognizes that fundamental dilemma faced by
United States persons who reside in a boycotting country when they
are confronted with host country laws which conflict with applicable
United States laws. The dilemma is created in large part because
of the antiboycott law's extraterritorial reach which extends its
umbrella to foreign corporations which are controlled subsidiaries of
United States companies.
Under this exception, United States persons resident in a foreign
country may comply with the laws of that country with respect to
their activities exclusively within that country and with respect to
their importation of specifically identifiable products imported for
their own use. 3 However, the exception in no event permits discrim-
ination on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin.44
Like the unilateral selection exception, this provision was the
subject of intense debate. Proponents saw it as essential to the
ability of United States companies located in boycotting countries
to continue doing business within those countries. Faced with the
choice of violating United States law or host country law, many
United States companies would undoubtedly choose to cease opera-
tions in the boycotting country.
Opponents, however, saw the exception as an opportunity for the
2 SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 45.
11 EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(2)(F).
" Id. § 4A(a)(3).
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creation of a glaring loophole. If United States companies which
happen to have a physical presence within a boycotting country
could freely comply with that country's boycott requirements, there
would be little left to United States antiboycott law so far as United
States multinationals are concerned.
As a consequence of these competing concerns, the limitations
created by the insertion of various qualifications on the scope of the
exception took on added importance. The term "specifically identi-
fiable products," which has its counterpart in the term "specific
goods" as used in the unilateral selection exception, was intended
to narrow the category of decisions which host country American
subsidiaries could make on a boycott basis." More important was
the concept that the category of import decisions which could be
made in conformity with foreign boycott law should be limited to
decisions about products which a person resident in a boycotting
country imports "for his own use." This concept was intended to
prevent wholesale use of the exception for compliance with foreign
boycott laws over the full range of business decisions made by mul-
tinational corporations. Without it, there would be essentially two
bodies of law-one for multinationals which would have optimum
flexibility in complying with a foreign boycott by conducting a part
of their operations as residents of a boycotting country-and one for
purely domestic United States concerns whose flexibility would be
much more constrained.
As it is, the local law exception inevitably creates a distinction
between multinational and purely domestic business enterprises.
But its constraints are intended to minimize the potential for dis-
similar treatment arising from differences in corporate structure.
However, the distinction between goods imported "for one's own
use" and goods imported for another is admittedly heroic, both
conceptually as well as legally, and has and will continue to present
some of the most difficult problems of interpretation and applica-
tion.
VI. ANALYZING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW
Because of the detailed exceptions and generalized prohibitions
in this statute, there is a tendency to analyze its applicability to
given situations by first asking whether the situation comes within
'1 EAR § 369.3 (f-2)(4), 43 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1978); § 369.3(c)(16) and (17), 43 Fed. Reg. 3528
(1978).
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one of the exceptions without asking two essential prior questions.
One is whether the transaction is subject to the law in the first
place. The answer to that depends on whether a "United States
person" is involved and whether the transaction is in United States
commerce.
The second is whether the transaction is subject to one of the
prohibitions. That depends among other things on whether the ac-
tion is taken with the requisite intent. It is often the case that
tortuous efforts to fit a transaction within one of the exceptions are
superfluous because the transaction offends no prohibition in the
first place.
It is only when the first two questions have been answered in the
affirmative, namely, that the transaction is subject to the law and
offends one of the prohibitions-that it becomes necessary to deter-
mine whether it comes within one of the exceptions.
VII. EVASION
There is one final step. Even if a transaction neither offends a
prohibition nor is encompassed by one of the exceptions, it is neces-
sary to determine whether it violates the express provision on eva-
sion. As indicated, the evasion provision expressly provides that the
law shall apply to any transaction or activity undertaken with in-
tent to evade the law.46 It further provides that the rules and regula-
tions which implement the statute shall not permit activities or
agreements, express or implied, which are not within the intent of
the exception."
This provision, more suitable perhaps as an expression of law
enforcement attitudes or healthy adjudicatory skepticism, reflects
the nervousness with which some viewed the exceptions as possible
loopholes. Its contours are not easily defined, but it will provide law
enforcement authorities with a vehicle for .piercing the form and
structure of a transaction to prevent the creation of devices for
compliance with boycott requirements through mechanisms which
superficially conform to activities described in the exceptions.
The regulations grapple with the concept of evasion by stating
that the use of any artifice, device, or scheme which is intended to
place a person at a commercial disadvantage or impose on him
special burdens because he is blacklisted or otherwise restricted for
" EAA sec. 201, § 4A(a)(6).
17 Id.
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boycott reasons from having a business relationship with or in a
boycotting country will be regarded as evasion. 8
Then, because of the particular attention focused on so-called risk
of loss provisions during the comment period on the regulations, the
final regulations specifically provide that unless permitted under
one of the exceptions, the use of risk of loss provisions that expressly
impose a financial risk on another because of the import laws of a
boycotting country may constitute evasion.49 The use of such a risk
of loss clause will be presumed to constitute evasion by the person
insisting on it if he introduces such a condition on doing business
with him after the effective date of the regulations, January 18,
1978. 10 This presumption may be rebutted by a showing that such a
provision is in customary usage without distinction between boycot-
ting and non-boycotting countries and that there is a non-boycott
reason for its use.5 '
This situation is to be contrasted with the case where a United
States person had customarily used a risk of loss provision before
the new regulations went into effect. There, continued use of such
a provision after the effective date of the regulations is presumed not
to constitute evasion.
The rationale for distinguishing between the two situations is that
it is difficult, conceptually, to treat as evasion of a new law a prac-
tice which existed before the new law went into effect. The circum-
stances of its application may change or its purpose as a device to
engage in prohibited activity might at some point emerge. But until
either occurs, the continuation of pre-existing risk of loss practices
will enjoy a presumption of legality.
On other aspects of evasion, the regulations provide that the use
of dummy corporations or other devices to mask prohibited activity
will also be regarded as evasion .5 The facts and circumstances of
an arrangement or transaction are to be carefully scrutinized to
determine whether appearances conform to reality.5 3 The regula-
tions provide, in addition, that it is evasion to divert specific boycot-
ting country orders from a United States parent corporation to a
foreign subsidiary for purposes of complying with prohibited boycott
" EAR § 369.4(c), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1978).
EAR § 369.4(d), 43 Fed. Reg. 3534 (1978).
I, d.
Id.
EAR § 369.4(e), 43 Fed. Reg. 3535 (1978).
53 Id.
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requirements. 4 However, they also provide that the alteration of a
company's structure or method of doing business will not constitute
evasion so long as the alteration is based on legitimate business
considerations and is not undertaken solely to avoid the antiboycott
law.55
As is evident, the evasion provision of the new law presents some
of the most difficult problems of interpretation and application. The
difficulties associated with risk of loss provisions have their counter-
part in the business diversion and alteration of business methods
issues.
No regulatory solution in an area which so intimately depends on
the facts of a particular case can be completely satisfactory. An
attempt to deal with a portion of the limitless situations which can
arise runs the risk of conveying misleading signals and forces the
regulation-writer to adjudicate hypothetical fact situations whose
character intimately depends on purpose, motivation, and intent.
On the other hand, failure to give flesh to a catch-all provision as
generally worded as the evasion provision of this statute would cast
an in terrorem pall over international business transactions, and in
this particular case, would violate the express congressional man-
date to provide maximum practical guidance and certainty to the
exporting community.5"
One of the important policy issues raised but not fully answered
by the evasion provision is its applicability to locus of doing busi-
ness decisions. While a distinction between avoidance and evasion
can be articulated in the context of the tax laws, the distinction
blurs in the context of laws, like the boycott law, which have the
protection of a class of persons as one of its principal objectives. If
the antiboycott law merely results in the transfer of business abroad
to more favorable legal climates or produces new structures and
forms for doing business which have the same operational conse-
quences for the class of persons the law seeks to protect, little, if
anything, will have been accomplished. Indeed, to the extent such
behavior diminishes the level of economic activity in the United
States, the law could harm the very interests it seeks to protect by
reducing overall opportunities for participation in international
trade. A law which leaves persons in legal jeopardy despite conform-
u Id.
:Id.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 37.
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ity of their activities to the letter of the law raises serious constitu-
tional problems. So, too, does a law which freezes business activities
in an existing mold and places serious constraints on traditional
freedom of movement. The new evasion provision of the statute will
undoubtedly provide opportunities to test the contours of the con-
cept as the antiboycott law is implemented and enforced.
VIII. UNITED STATES COMMERCE
The new boycott law may also have significance for the develop-
ment of United States law on extraterritoriality. The scope of the
law's extraterritorial impact depends in large part on the definition
of United States commerce since the law reaches controlled foreign
subsidiaries of United States companies only with respect to their
activities in United States commerce.
Under the regulations, a controlled foreign subsidiary's transac-
tion with a boycotting country or other third party is in United
States commerce when the foreign subsidiary acquires goods or serv-
ices from the United States for purposes of completing the transac-
tion with that third party.57 There are two basic exceptions. One is
where the subsidiary disposes of goods acquired from the United
States without substantial alteration or modification. Those trans-
actions are in United States commerce under the regulations despite
the fact that the goods are not acquired for the specific purpose of
disposition to an identified third party." The rationale is that other-
wise the regulations would create an inevitable incentive for United
States companies to source from their foreign subsidiaries sales
which would otherwise be made directly from the United States.59
The other exception is for so-called "ancillary services." Under
this exception, a foreign subsidiary's receipt of ancillary services
from the United States does not bring that subsidiary's otherwise
foreign transaction into United States commerce. 0 Ancillary serv-
ices are defined as services provided primarily for the subsidiary's
own use rather than that of a third person. They include financial,
accounting, and legal services whether provided by the subsidiary's
parent or an unrelated entity.'
The rationale for this exception is that such ancillary services are
' EAR § 369.1(d)(8), 43 Fed. Reg. 3514 (1978).
EAR § 369.1(d)(8)(iv), 43 Fed. Reg. 3514 (1978).
" See EAR Preamble, 43 Fed. Reg. 3509 (1978).
EAR § 369.1(d)(5), 43 Fed. Reg. 3514 (1978).
" EAR § 369.1(d)(14), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978).
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typically interchangeable with those furnished by non-United
States persons and could be obtained from non-United States
sources with relative ease.2 A rule which discouraged the use of
United States source ancillary services would have little if any posi-
tive antiboycott effect. As pointed out in the preamble to the regula-
tions, it could, in fact, have adverse antiboycott consequences by
driving United States controlled foreign subsidiaries into the hands
of foreign companies which have little, if any, compunction about
complying with foreign boycotts opposed by the United States. 3
Therefore, under the regulations, the provision of project financ-
ing by a United States bank or legal services by a United States law
firm to a United States controlled foreign subsidiary is an ancillary
service which will not cause the subsidiary's otherwise foreign trans-
action with third parties to be in United States commerce. 4 By
contrast, the regulations provide that where a domestic concern
gives a guarantee of performance to a third party on behalf of its
controlled foreign subsidiary, that is a service provided primarily to
the customer and, as such, brings the subsidiary's transaction with
the customer into United States commerce. 5 Similarly, as pointed
out in the regulations, architectural or engineering services provided
by a United States company in connection with a controlled foreign
subsidiary's construction project in a third country are typically
passed through to the subsidiary's customers and, as such, bring the
subsidiary's transaction 'With the third party into United States
commerce. 6
These exceptions as well as the general rule on United States
commerce require the drawing of fine distinctions. The distinctions
are made necessary by the effort to avoid placing the universe of
transactions in United States origin goods under the umbrella of
United States commerce and to apply United States law instead to
those circumstances where there is a relatively direct link between
a foreign subsidiary's acquisition of goods and services from the
United States and their subsequent disposition to third parties.
These distinctions are also necessary to avoid so limiting the con-
cept of United States commerce as to exclude United States subsidi-
aries from the law altogether.
62 EAR Preamble, 43 Fed. Reg. 3509 (1978).
a Id.
" EAR § 369.1(d)(15), 43 Fed. Reg. 3515 (1978).
SId.
*' Id.
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Some of those who commented on the regulations before they
became final argued that the United States commerce concept
should extend to any foreign subsidiary dispositions of United
States origin goods or services no matter how remote the connection
between the disposition and the original acquisition. Under that
view, a foreign subsidiary which stocks part of its inventory with
components from the United States would be subject to American
law with respect to all dispositions of the end-product no matter
how remote from the original acquisition from the United States
and no matter how small a proportion of the total content of the
end-product was represented by the United States components.
An alternative view urged on the Department of Commerce would
have United States commerce cease at the point where the foreign
subsidiary acquires the goods from the United States. Any subse-
quent dispositions would be beyond the reach of the law. Under that
approach, the law would have virtually no application to transac-
tions between American foreign subsidiaries and third parties. 7
The adoption of a general nexus test avoids either extreme and
applies the law to those circumstances where the United States
interest can reasonably be regarded as more compelling than that
of the country within which the subsidiary operates. However, like
the concept of evasion, this too will require further development as
the law is implemented and enforced and could ultimately require
the courts to make difficult conflict of law choices.
IX. CONCLUSION
It will be some time before the full dimensions and effect of the
law are fully understood. The law is the product of intense contro-
versy; it is the product of cooperation and compromise. After
months of disagreement and weeks of negotiation, the American
Jewish community and the American business community joined
forces in the spring of 1977 to pave the way for its enactment.
While the law applies to all unsanctioned foreign boycotts, it has
its foundation in a long and bitter struggle in a turbulent part of the
world. American political commitments and American dedication
to human rights and equal opportunity are woven between its lines.
The issues which the legislation raises and the issues which it
addresses are issues on which reasonable men can and do differ.
They are issues which transcend the antiboycott law itself. How
they are resolved here will have significance for other efforts to
regulate business activity in an increasingly integrated world where
political and economic issues are deeply intertwined.
17 EAR Preamble, 43 Fed. Reg. 3508-09 (1978).
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